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York: York: Exception Becomes the Rule:

The Exception Becomes the Rule: The
Missouri Supreme Court Expands the
Continuing Care Exception
Montgomery v. South County Radiologists, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION

For over sixty years, physicians in Missouri have relied on the two-year
statute of limitation on medical malpractice claims and its limited number of
exceptions to avoid potential liability arising from stale claims.2 One of those
exceptions, the continuing care exception, provides a limited set of
circumstances in which plaintiffs can bring claims after the running of the twoyear statute of limitation Until recently, the continuing care exception was
limited in its application and allowed physicians to avoid stale claims while
providing patients with a clear time frame in which to bring their actions.4 That
limited application, however, has been changed drastically by the Missouri
Supreme Court's decision in Montgomery v. South County Radiologists,Inc.5

This Note addresses the importance of the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision in Montgomery and its future effect on the continuing care exception,
the Missouri statute of limitation, and the health care environment in general.
First, this Note examines the origins of the continuing care exception and its
development throughout Missouri jurisprudence. This Note then reviews the
majority's decision in Montgomery and argues that the Missouri Supreme Court
inappropriately extended the scope of the exception. Finally, this Note suggests
that the interpretation of the continuing care exception used by the majority in
Montgomery offers no guidance for providers of auxiliary medical services,
which will result in an overall increase in the cost of health care and result in the
application of the exception in more cases than the Missouri statute of limitation,
effectually transforming the exception into the rule.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

On February 14, 1995, Evan Montgomery was referred to St. Anthony's
Medical Center by his neurosurgeon to have x-rays and an MRI on his lower
back.6 On the same day, Dr. Szoko, a physician employed by South County

1.
2.
3.
4.

49 S.W.3d 191 (Mo. 2001).
Id. at 193.
See infra note 15.
Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 194.

5. See id.
6. Evan Montgomery had previously suffered from chronic lower lumbar pain. Id.
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Radiologists, Inc. ("SCR"),7 read and interpreted the x-ray films and MRI
imaging of Evan Montgomery's lower back.8 Persistent complications forced
Montgomery back to St. Anthony's for further x-rays and MRIs on July 31 and
November 3 of the same year.9 Each time, a different physician employed by
SCR reviewed and interpreted the x-rays and MRI films.'" After the first
referral, it was common for patients to receive further radiological services at St.
Anthony's and it was South County's "standard of care" to require its physicians
to "review and compare previous radiologists' reports and films."'" All three
South County physicians failed to detect and diagnose an osteosarcoma (a
cancerous tumor) on Montgomery's spine. 2
On May 23, 1997, Evan and Judith Montgomery filed suit against SCR and
the three reviewing physicians employed by SCR for medical negligence.' 3 The
circuit court judge granted Dr. Szoko's motion for summary judgment and
SCR's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the radiological
services performed on February 14.'4 Dr. Szoko and SCR alleged that the
Montgomerys filed their action outside the established two-year statute of
limitation. 5 The trial court agreed and specifically noted that Dr. Szoko and

Thus, to isolate a cause, he was referred to St. Anthony's Medical Center to obtain
radiological services. Id.
7. South County Radiologists, Inc. is an entity that hires physicians specializing in
the field of radiology to look at and interpret films taken by technicians at St. Anthony's
Medical Center. Id. Through a contractual relationship, SCR is the exclusive provider
of radiology services at St. Anthony's Medical Center. Id.
8. Id.at 193.
9. Id.
10. It was the established policy and practice of SCR to "assign radiologists on a
rotating basis." Id.
11. Id. "When a patient is first referred to SCR, a patient file-or 'jacket'-is
created, on which an SCR radiologist records patient diagnostics and information. Each
time an SCR radiologist reviews films of a patient, the radiologist includes both the film
and report in the patient's jacket." Id. at 192-93. At no time did any radiologist
employed by South County have any personal contact with Montgomery. Id. at 193.
12. Approximately two weeks after the final referral with the SCR, Montgomery's
x-rays and MRI films were reviewed by a physician not employed by South County who
subsequently detected the osteosarcoma. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 192.
15. Id. at 193. The statute reads:
All actions against physicians, hospitals ... and any other entity providing

health care services and all employees of any of the foregoing acting in the
course and scope of their employment, for damages for malpractice,
negligence, error or mistake related to health care shall be brought within two
years from the date of occurrence of the act of neglect complained of.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105 (2000).
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SCR did not fall within the "continuing care" exception in its grant of summary
judgment. 6
Following the trial court's decision, the Montgomerys appealed to the
Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals.' 7 On appeal, the
Montgomerys alleged that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the trial court's determination that the continuing care exception did not apply
to Dr. Szoko and SCR. 8 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case
back to the trial court with the majority holding that the continuing care
exception did in fact apply to both Dr. Szoko and SCR.' 9 After the decision, the
Missouri Supreme Court heard the case. The majority opinion, written by Judge
Benton, held that the continuing care exception did not apply to Dr. Szoko.
Thus, the grant of summary judgment with regard to him was appropriate. The
continuing care exception did apply to SCR, however, and, thus, the granting of
partial summary judgment with regard to SCR was improper. The court
remanded the case for trial.2 ° The majority held that SCR was an entity that
provided continuing radiological services and, thus, had a duty of continuing
care until its relationship with Mr. Montgomery ended. 2' Chief Justice
Limbaugh filed an opinion in which he concurred with the majority with regard
to Dr. Szoko and dissented with regard to the application of the continuing care
exception to SCR.22

16. The continuing care exception is commonly known as the "Thatcher Rule," as
it was created in Thatcher v. De Tar, in which the Missouri Supreme Court held that
"where the treatment is continuing and of such nature as to charge the medical [provider]
with the duty of continuing care and treatment which is essential to recovery until the
relation ceases," the statute of limitation does not begin to run until that relationship
ends. Thatcher v. De Tar, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1943); see also Montgomery, 49
S.W.3d at 194.
17. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 193 ("The Montgomerys dismissed-without
prejudice-their claims against the remaining defendants (including the other two SCR
radiologists), making a final judgment for purposes of appeal.").

18. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, Inc., No. ED 77285, 2000 WL
1846432, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,49 S.W.3d

191 (Mo. 2001).
19. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 196-97.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Missouri's Statute of Limitation in Medical MalpracticeCases
Prior to its current codification in Missouri Revised Statutes Section
516.105,23 the statute of limitation in medical malpractice actions was amended
and moved from Sections 1012 and 1016 to Sections 516.100 and 516.140
respectively.2 4 A discussion of the history and the evolution of the statute is
necessary to analyze its language and determine its specific purpose.
All statutes of limitation in Missouri have their general origins in the 1807
Territorial Laws of Missouri.25 More specifically, however, the statute of
limitation for medical negligence currently codified in Section 516.105 originated
in an 1849 act.26 In that act, for the first time, statutory language separated
medical negligence from all other types of negligence and fixed a two-year
statute of limitation for general acts of negligence 27 and a five-year statute of
limitation for acts of medical negligence. 28 These separate periods for bringing
actions for general negligence and actions for medical negligence remained until
the General Assembly amended the section in 1921.29 The amendment continued
to separate actions for general negligence from actions for medical negligence,
but it changed the statute of limitation for medical negligence from five to two
years.3" More importantly, the Missouri General Assembly changed the statutory
language itself. Under the 1849 provisions, actions for both general negligence
and medical negligence began to toll when damages were ascertainable.3 The
1921 amendment, however, changed the medical negligence provisions to read
that all actions for medical negligence must be brought within two years "from
the date of the act of neglect complained of."32 In 1945, the General Assembly
reenacted much of former Section 1016, and added various causes of action, but
the medical negligence portion remained distinct.3 The reenacted provisions
23. Id. at 195.
24. Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 311-13 (Mo. 1968).
25. Id. at 312.
26. Act of Feb. 4, 1849, art II, §§ 4-6, 1849 Mo. LAWS 73, 74-75 (reforming the
pleadings and practice in Courts of Justice in Missouri).
27. Laughlin, 432 S.W.2d at 312 ("Section 6, Article II of an 1849 Act... fixed
a two year limitation on . . . an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, or false
imprisonment").
28. Id. But see infra note 34.
29. Laughlin, 432 S.W.2d at 312.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 313.
32. Id. at 312.
33. Id. at 312-13. "Again, significantly, and indicative of its intent to treat
malpractice actions differently from other actions so far as the date of commencement
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were later compiled into a new chapter of the revised code and set out in Section
516.140. 34 The Missouri Supreme Court has explained the distinction between
statutes related to the limitation on bringing a general negligence claim and a
medical negligence claim as a clear sign of "legislative intent to treat particularly
with medical malpractice actions and fix a specific date when the statute of
limitation shall begin to run against those actions" and that date was to be
different from the date when the statute is to run in all other actions."
In 1976, the legislature again modified the language setting forth the
limitation on medical negligence claims found in Section 516.140.36 The new
Act, Section 516.105, 37 contained almost identical language as to the general
statute of limitation rule (two years from the date of neglect), but it contained a
specific exception with regard to acts of medical negligence which allow foreign
objects to remain within the body after surgery has taken place.38 In these rare
instances, the statute provided that the two-year statute of limitation was not to
begin running until the date of discovery.39
B. The "Thatcher Rule"
The continuing care exception has its origins in the Missouri Supreme
Court's Thatcher v. De Tar decision.40 In Thatcher, William Thatcher brought
a medical malpractice suit against B. E. De Tar for leaving a surgical needle in
his body during an appendectomy operation.4' The operation was completed on
August 25, 1937, but Thatcher remained in considerable pain after the
operation.42 Dr. De Tar continued to treat Thatcher until some time in October

of the running of the statute is concerned, the General Assembly, in 1945, repealed and
but left intact and unchanged the provision that malpractice
reenacted [Section] 1016 ...
actions shall be brought within two years from the date of the act of neglect." Id. at 313.
34. Id. at 310. Section 516.140 stated the general rule that all "actions against
physicians, surgeons, and others, for damages for malpractice.., shall be brought within
two years from the date of the act of neglect complained of." Id.; see Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 516.140 (1959).
35. Laughlin, 432 S.W.2d at 312.
36. Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Mo. 1998); see infra note 44.
37. Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 117; see Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195.
38. Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 117. Section 516.105 has survived equal protection, due

process, right of privacy, and special law challenges. Ross v. Kansas City Gen. Hosp. &
Med. Ctr., 608 S.W.2d 397, 400-01 (Mo. 1980).
39. Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 117.
40. 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1943).

41. Id. at 761.
42. Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 16
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

of 1939, when Thatcher obtained the services of another physician who
discovered the needle and successfully removed it.43
Thatcher did not file suit within the established two-year statute of limitation
and the circuit court dismissed the action. 4 According to the statute at the time,
all actions for medical malpractice must be "brought within two years from the
date of the act of neglect complained of."45 In a unanimous decision, the
Missouri Supreme Court held that common sense and notions ofjustice dictated
that the statute of limitation in the case did not begin to run until "the treatment
by the defendant ceased. '4 6 Thus, when the treatment by a physician is
continuing or of the type to charge the physician with a duty of continuing care
essential to recovery, the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the
relationship ceases.47
In reaching its decision, the court relied on two key elements. First, the
court relied on statutory authority found in Section 1012 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes.4 8 Section 1012 stated the general rule in Missouri that statutes of

43. Id. Dr. De Tar did not perform an x-ray on Thatcher at any time after the
August 25, 1937 appendectomy nor during his subsequent treatment. Id.
44. See Mo. REV.

STAT.

§ 1016 (1939) ("All actions against physicians, surgeons,

dentists, reoentgenologists, nurses, hospitals and sanitariums for damages for
malpractice, error, or mistake shall be brought within two years from the date of the act
of neglect complained of.").
45. Id. Today, the relevant portions of the 1939 version of Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 1016 have been amended and are now codified as Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 516.105 (2000), which reads as follows:
All actions against physicians, hospitals, dentists, registered or licensed
practical nurses, optometrists, podiatrists, pharmacists, chiropractors,
professional physical therapists, and any other entity providing health care
services and all employees of any of the foregoing acting in the course and
scope of their employment, for damages for malpractice, negligence, error or
mistake related to health care shall be brought within two years from the date
of occurrence of the act of neglect complained of, except that:
(1) In cases in which the act of neglect complained of is introducing and
negligently permitting any foreign object to remain within the body of a living
person, the action shall be brought within two years from the date of the
discovery of such alleged negligence, or from the date on which the patient
in the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered such alleged
negligence, whichever date first occurs.
Id.
46. Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 762.
47. Id.
48. Id. Section 1012 read as follows:
Civil actions, other than those for the recovery of real property, can only
be commenced within the periods prescribed in the following sections, after
the causes of actions shall have accrued: Provided, that for the purposes of
this article, the cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong
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limitation for causes of action based on negligence and breach of contract do not
begin to run until the damages resulting therefrom are ascertainable.49
Furthermore, Section 1012 expressly stated that it applies to all following
sections, and, thus, the court found that the language in Section 1012 controlled
actions for medical negligence under Section 1016.50 The court, therefore,
applied the "until damages resulting therefrom are ascertainable" rule to medical
negligence cases and held that the statute of limitation did not run until the
treatment by the physician ceased. 5
Finally, the court relied on the holdings of other courts in various states that
had similar statutes of limitation for medical negligence and had found a
continuing care exception to apply to their respective statutes. 52 Specifically, the
court was persuaded by the decisions in three cases in Ohio and Minnesota.53
From these cases, the Missouri Supreme Court found that a large number of
jurisdictions had adopted the rule that statutes of limitation in medical negligence
cases do not begin to run until the relationship with the treating physician
ceases.54 Furthermore, the treatment by a physician and the employment of the
physician by the patient should be "considered as a whole," and if malpractice
occurs within the scope of that relationship, any statute of limitation should not
run until the treatment itself ceases. 55
The Missouri Supreme Court first applied the "Thatcher rule," or the
continuing care exception, 56as it applied to Section 516.105 in Shaw v. Clough."
In Shaw, Robert Shaw consulted a physician after experiencing considerable pain
in his neck. 58 The physician diagnosed Shaw with cervical spondylitic disease
and recommended a procedure in which a bone plug would be removed from
Shaw's thigh and fused with the bone in his neck to prevent further

is done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the
damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment, and,
if more than one item of damage, then the last item, so that all resulting
damage may be recovered, and full and complete relief obtained.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 1012 (1939).
49. Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 762.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (relying on the holdings in cases from California, Minnesota, New York,
Ohio, and Wisconsin).
53. See Schmitt v. Esser, 226 N.W. 196, 197 (Minn. 1929); Bowers v. Santee, 124
N.E. 238, 240 (Ohio 1919); Gillette v. Tucker, 65 N.E. 865, 870 (Ohio 1902).
54. Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 763.
55. Id.; see also Schmitt, 226 N.W. at 197.
56. See supra note 16.
57. 597 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
58. Id. at 214.
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deterioration.59 The physician performed the operation in March 1975 and
continued to treat Shaw on an out-patient basis after that time.6 Unfortunately,
Shaw began having pain in his thigh where the physician had removed the bone
plug.6' In August 1975, exploratory surgery on Shaw's thigh revealed that the
physician had negligently performed the original procedure.62 Shaw brought suit
in April 1977 against the physician for medical negligence. 63 The trial court
granted the physician's motion for summary judgment based on the two-year
statute of limitation in Section 516.105.64 The Missouri Supreme Court, relying
on the holding in Thatcher v. De Tar, however, held that the continuing care
exception applied and that the statute of limitation period provided for in Section
516.105 did not begin to run until August 1975, when the relationship ended.65
In its holding, the court stated that the doctor-patient relationship is an intensely
personal one in which the patient places his or her trust in the physician's skills
and judgment.66 If the physician is negligent in his treatment, the physician
should be held responsible and because the doctor-patient relationship is so
personal, the statute of limitation should not begin to run until the relationship
has ceased.
Following the Shaw decision, the Missouri courts of appeals considered the
continuing care exception to Section 516.105 in a number of modem situations.
First, in Green v. Washington University Medical Center,67 the Eastern District
refused to extend the continuing care exception to a group of medical providers,
including two radiologists, who failed to diagnose the presence of a calcified
kidney stone in the plaintiff.68 The court found that the isolated actions by the
group of physicians did not meet the definition set forth in Thatcher.69
Specifically, the court stated that, because the radiologists only interpreted x-rays
and an electrocardiogram and did not personally see or examine the plaintiff, they
could not be charged with the duty of continuing care."0

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id. Exploratory surgery revealed "an entrapment of the lateral femoral
cutaneous nerve at the donor site for the bone graft for the neck stabilization." Id.
63. Id. Specifically, Shaw alleged that the physician's care was negligent and that
the damage done to his thigh was in fact permanent. Id.

64. Id. at 213.
65. Id. at 215-16.
66. Shaw, 597 S.W.2d at 215.
67. 761 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
68. Id. at 689. The plaintiff brought suit approximately three years after the initial
examination by Dr. Terrell, an internist, and the interpretation of x-rays and an
electrocardiogram by Dr. Murphy and Dr. Garrett. Id.

69. Id. at 690. For a discussion of the holding in Thatcher, see supranote 16.
70. Green, 761 S.W.2d at 689-90.
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Less than a year after the decision in Green, in Shroyer v. McCarthy,7 the
Western District also refused to extend the continuing care exception.72 In this
case, the plaintiff wished to avoid the limitation provided in Section 516.105
based on the time it took him to discover the identity of the physician who had
caused the injury by negligently operating an electrical muscle stimulation unit.73
The plaintiff was injured in September 1984, but the identity of the treating
physician was not known until February 1987. 7' The court, relying on Laughlin
v. Forgrave,7s held that the General Assembly specifically used the words "from
the date of the act of neglect., 76 The court found, therefore, there was no
exception in Missouri that stopped Section 516.105 from continuing to run while
the plaintiff strove to identify his or her treating physician.77
In 1997, in Shah v. Lehman, 8 the Eastern District refused to broaden the
scope of the continuing care exception to include hospitals.79 In that case, the
plaintiff underwent two operations relating to the same hip condition at the
defendant hospital within a nine-year period.8" The court found no precedent in
Missouri law for extending the continuing care exception to hospitals."
Furthermore, the court found that a nine-year period between procedures did not
meet the definition of continuing care.8"
The following year, the Western District Court of Appeals relied heavily on
the holding in Shah v. Lehman in refusing to apply the continuing care exception
to an adult care facility.83 In Dunagan v. Shalom GeriatricCenter,84 the plaintiff
brought suit seeking damages for five separate injuries that had occurred over a
three-year period from April 1992 through September 1995.85 The plaintiff filed

71. 769 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
72. Id. at 160-61.
73. Id. at 157. The plaintiff sustained bums to his arm and wrist when a physician
employed by Ford Motor Company negligently operated an electrical muscle stimulation
unit. Id.
74. Id. at 160.
75. 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1968).
76. Shroyer, 769 S.W.2d at 160.
77. Id. at 160-61.
78. 953 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
79. Id. at 958.
80. Id. at 956.
81. Id. at 958 ("Plaintiff has not referred us to any case that has applied the
'continuing care' exception to a hospital. Nor has our independent research disclosed
any.").
82. Id.
83. See Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric Ctr., 967 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
84. Id. at 289.
85. Id. at 287. The plaintiff, an Alzheimer's disease patient, alleged the following
injuries: a fractured left leg on April 22, 1992; a fractured right hip on July 13, 1992; a
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his action more than two years after the first three injuries had occurred. 6
Because of this, the trial court held that Section 516.105 barred those claims.87
The court of appeals agreed, holding that the continuing care exception had only
applied "in cases where a single physician has provided the continuing treatment,
not where an entity has provided continuing care."88 In defining the exception,
the court stated that, "under the continuing care exception, the statute does not
begin to run against a plaintiff until the defendant ceases to treat the injury caused
by the act of neglect." 9 The exception only applies in cases where the
relationship is of such a nature to "charge the medical man with the duty of
continuing care and treatment which is essential to recovery."9 Because these
were five separate acts and not the continuing treatment of a single injury, the
court held that the continuing care exception did not apply.9 Also, although the
plaintiffreceived continuing care for Alzheimer's disease, the disease was not the
injury caused by the alleged acts of neglect.92 The injuries caused by the alleged
act of neglect were the five separate fractures he suffered.93 The court found that
the plaintiff failed to prove that he received continuing care for the fractures that
was "essential to his recovery," and because of this, the continuing care
exception did not apply.94
Four months after the decision in Dunagan v. Shalom GeriatricCenter, the

Missouri Supreme Court attempted to clarify the continuing care exception in
Weiss v. Rojanasathit.95 The court held that the continuing care exception did not
apply to a gynecologist who failed to inform a patient of a precancerous
condition.96 In its decision, the court clarified the continuing care exception by
stating that a physician owes a duty of continuing care unless the relationship is
ended by: "(1) the mutual consent of the parties, (2) the physician's withdrawal
after reasonable notice, (3) the dismissal of the physician by the patient, or (4) the
cessation of the necessity that gave rise to the relationship."97 The court

fractured left hip on November 14, 1992; fractured left leg and knee in January 1995; and
a fractured left ankle on September 20, 1995. The plaintiff filed suit on June 30, 1995.
Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 289.

89. Id.; see also Hill v. Klontz, 909 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
90. Dunagan,967 S.W.2d at 289.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see supra note 85.

94. Dunagan,967 S.W.2d at 289.
95. 975 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. 1998).
96. Id. at 119-21.
97. Id. at 119-20; see also Reed v. Laughlin, 58 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Mo. 1933);
Cazzell v. Scholfield, 8 S.W.2d 580, 587 (Mo. 1928).
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expressed concern over the outcome of the decision, but it felt constrained by the
express language of the statute.98 Judge Price wrote that "the legislative branch
of the government has determined the policy of the state and clearly fixed the
time when the limitation period begins to run against actions for malpractice." 99
Because of this, the court stated that arguments to change the policy should be
addressed by the General Assembly and not the court, whose duty it is to00interpret
laws, "not to disregard the law as written by the General Assembly."'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority
In Montgomery v. South County Radiologists,Inc.,"' the majority began its
opinion by quickly affirming the circuit court's ruling granting summary
judgment to Dr. Szoko.0 2 The Missouri Supreme Court found that Dr. Szoko
performed only a single act of interpreting an x-ray."0 3 The express language of
Section 516.105, therefore, required the action to be brought within two years. 0 4
The court held that "where a physician commits an act of neglect on one specific
date, and has no other contact with the patient, the statute of limitation begins to
run on that date."'0 5
The majority then turned its attention to the question of applying the
continuing care exception to South County Radiologists ("SCR") as an entity.
The majority began its discussion by stating that, while it is true that the
physician-patient relationship ends when the necessity that gave rise to the
relationship ends, the necessity that gave rise to the relationship was "the
patient's ailment or condition."' 6 The majority stated that "an entity that
provides continuing radiological services has a proportionate duty of continuing
care until its relation with the patient ends."'0 7 Furthermore, because the patient

98. Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 121. The court was given concern by the plaintiffs
argument that Section 516.105 serves an injustice to those who are unable to ascertain
or discover their damages until after the two-year statute of limitation. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id.

101. 49 S.W.3d 191 (Mo. 2001).
102. Id. at 193-94.
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id. at 193-94.

105. Id. at 194. For a complete discussion of the services performed by Dr. Szoko
see supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
106. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 194; see also Cazzell v. Schofield, 8 S.W.2d 580,
587 (Mo. 1928).
107. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195; see also Poluski v. Richardson Transp., 877

S.W.2d 709, 713 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
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complained to his neurosurgeon of pain on three occasions over a nine-month
period and because the neurosurgeon ordered tests from SCR on each occasion,
the physician as well as the entity had a duty of continuing care.' The necessity
that "gives rise to the relationship is the patient's ailment or condition."'0 9 Thus,
the relationship continued until it was "ended by the consent of parties, or
revoked by the dismissal of the physician, or until his services are no longer
needed." "0 This duty arises because treating physicians must rely on services
from supporting entities such as groups providing radiological services."' Based
on this, the majority rejected SCR's contention that it did not owe the patient a
duty of continuing care." 2
Finally, the majority decided that, because the plain language of Section
516.105 includes entities that provide health care, those entities must also be
subject to the continuing care exception to Section 516.105.'
In reaching its
holding, the majority stated that while no court had yet applied the exception to
entities, no case expressly stated that entities could not be subject to the
continuing care exception,' and, thus, because SCR could be subject to the
continuing care exception, summary judgment was not appropriate and the case
was remanded." 5
B. The Dissent
Chief Justice Limbaugh, in his dissenting opinion, expressed concern with
the reasoning used by the majority to expand the scope of the continuing care
exception." 6 He concurred with the majority holding that the continuing care

108. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195 ("While SCR's obligations are not as
comprehensive as the treating physician's, its services are of such a nature to charge it
with accurately interpreting and comparing x-rays and MRIs for the same complaint by
the same patient about the same part of the body, three times within a nine-month
period.").
109. Id. at 194.
110. Id.; see also Cazzell, 8 S.W.2d at 587.
111. Montomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195.
112. Id.
113. Id. The statute expressly covers any "entity providing health care services."
Thus, there is no statutory distinction between individual physicians and health care
entities. Id.; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (2001).
114. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195; see also Shah v. Lehman, 953 S.W.2d 955,
958 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric Ctr., 967 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1998).
115. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195.
116. Id. at 196-97 (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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exception did not apply to Dr. Szoko." 7 He disagreed, however, with the
majority's decision to apply the exception to SCR."'
Beginning his dissent, Chief Justice Limbaugh stated that, under the express
language of Section 516.105, the continuing care exception should be limited to
situations like that in Thatcher v. De Tar"9 where the "continuing care is an act
of continuing negligence."' 2 ° The legislature has continuously amended the
statute without extending its scope and because of this, Chief Justice Limbaugh
argued, deference must be afforded to the legislature. 2 '
Furthermore, Chief Justice Limbaugh took issue with two particular aspects
of the majority's reasoning. First, Chief Justice Limbaugh argued, the majority
inaccurately defined "necessity" by stating that "the necessity that gives rise to
the relationship is the patient's ailment or condition."' 2 While this definition
may fit with a primary treating physician, Chief Justice Limbaugh stated, it does
not fit with physicians or entities that merely perform single acts of diagnostic
procedure.' 23 These individuals are consulted for the purpose of performing
these services and for these services alone.' 24 More importantly, when
Montgomery and the treating physician contracted with SCR to perform the
diagnostic services, "neither they, nor the treating physician, nor the patient
intended that care or treatment
would continue beyond the conduct of the
25
examination ordered."
Finally, though he agreed with the notion that entities as well as individual
physicians should be subject to the continuing care exception, Chief Justice
Limbaugh disagreed with the majority's statements that, because physicians rely
on specialists, those providing specialty services have a proportionate duty of
continuing care until that relationship ends.' 26 The fault in this logic, according
to Chief Justice Limbaugh, is that the "duty of continuing care arises from the
need for the entity in question to provide continuing care, not from the

117. Id. at 196 (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119. 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943).
120. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 196 (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Both Thatcher v. De Tar and Missouri Revised Statutes Section
516.105(1) state that the statute of limitation ceases to run in cases of medical negligence
where a foreign object is permitted to remain in the body of a patient. Thatcher, 173
S.W.2d at 762; Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105(1) (2001).
121. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 196 (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
122. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 197 (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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circumstance that care or treatment was in fact provided."' 27 Simply put, the
majority held that the continuing care exception applies because SCR performed
multiple services over a period of time, not "that there was a duty of continuing
care to conduct those successive examinations."'2 8 Therefore, Chief Justice
Limbaugh contended, each of the diagnostic services was a separate act, rather
than continuing conduct, and, therefore, the statute of limitation barred the claims
against both Dr. Szoko and SCR."2 9
V. COMMENT
In Montgomery, the Missouri Supreme Court made two important
determinations with regard to the continuing care exception to the two-year
statute of limitation in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 516.105.30 First, the
court held that, through a plain reading of the statute, the continuing care
exception applies to entities as well as individual physicians.' Though this is
arguably an expansion in the scope of the statute, it is a logical expansion and
one that appears consistent with the intent of the legislature.'32 The continuing
care exception is a common law exception to statutes of limitation in medical
cases, and, thus, it is not mandated by statutory authority. The Missouri General
Assembly has, however, continued to revise Section 516.105 without expressing
any dissatisfaction with the exception in its revisions, therefore, arguably giving
its implicit approval. " Furthermore, the legislature has continued to amend the
statute to establish the boundaries of the limitation, and, by implication, the
boundaries of the exception. In the 2001 revision of Section 516.105, the
legislature used the phrase "or any other entity providing health care services."' 34
This phrase clearly expresses an intent to hold physician groups accountable
without regard to legal identity. Simply put, medical professionals should not
avoid potential liability by forming an organization. This is a logical step in
applying the continuing care exception in today's complex medical environment.
The court's second determination, however, does not appear consistent with
legislative intent and is an unfortunate example of the courts improperly taking
upon themselves the role of the Missouri General Assembly. InMontgomery, the
majority, after holding that the continuing care exception applied to entities as

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
dissenting
132.
133.
134.

Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See supra note 15.
Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195 (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and
in part).
See supra Part III.A.
See supra notes 25-39.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105 (2001).
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well as individual physicians, expanded the statute to cover those medical
providers who have no personal contact with a patient and who provide merely
auxiliary medical services.'35
In its opinion, the majority stated that, although the physician-patient
relationship ends by the "cessation of the necessity that gave rise to the
relationship," that necessity is the patient's ailment or condition.'36 Thus, when
Montgomery received radiological services from SCR, it was his ailment or
condition that was the "necessity" that gave rise to the relationship between him
and SCR; therefore, SCR owed him a duty of continuing care.' 37 In his dissent,
Chief Justice38Limbaugh correctly stated that this is an inaccurate definition of
"necessity."'
With radiological services, or most other auxiliary services, the
purpose of the auxiliary service is to obtain diagnostic interpretations or test
results, not to cure an ailment or condition. The definition established by the
majority can only logically be applied to primary treating physicians. In the
context of auxiliary services, the necessity that gave rise to the relationship ends
once the medical provider interprets the diagnostic results.'39
Furthermore, it is clear that medical personnel who provide auxiliary
services usually have little or no personal contact with patients, and neither they,
nor the patients, intend the relationship to be personal or continue beyond the
diagnostic services ordered. 4 ° This kind of relationship is vastly different than
the relationship that gave rise to the continuing care exception in Thatcher,4' and
the vast majority of courts that have interpreted the continuing care exception
have held that the exception is only intended to apply a duty of continuing care
to a doctor-patient relationship that is "a highly personal and close one."' 42
Instead of this limited application, the Montgomery decision potentially imposes
the duty of continuing care on virtually every provider of medical services. Thus,
radiologists, pharmacists, chemists, lab technicians, x-ray technicians, and
virtually every other medical care provider would seem to be subject to the
continuing care exception even though they have no contact with the patient.
Forcing these groups to be subject to liability for stale claims will result in an
unnecessary increase in the cost of health care, health insurance, and medical
malpractice insurance. The result will be a net loss for patients.
Also, in its holding, the majority relied on the fact that each radiologist for
SCR provided a report to a common file on Montgomery and the fact that each

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 196 (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Limbaugh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Thatcher v. De Tar, 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943).
Shaw v. Clough, 597 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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successive radiologist compared his or her findings to the previous report.'43
According to the majority, this is evidence that SCR had a continuing duty to
Montgomery.'" This would be true if SCR were a group of physicians practicing
primary care. SCR, however, is a group of radiologists who perform auxiliary
diagnostic services with no personal relationship or personal contact with the
patients receiving those tests. Because there is no personal relationship or
contact between SCR radiologists and those patients receiving tests, the policy
of reviewing previous reports is necessary in order to properly interpret the
diagnostic tests. Thus, the policy of reviewing previous reports is evidence that
there was in fact no personal relationship between SCR and the patients receiving
tests. Instead of seeing it this way, the majority's holding provides a disincentive
for medical groups performing diagnostic or other auxiliary services to review the
reports generated by previous diagnostic tests.
Next, the majority reasoned that, because physicians rely on those who
provide auxiliary services, entities that provide those services should have a
proportionate duty of continuing care with that of the treating physician.'45 Based
on this reasoning, whether or not a provider of auxiliary services falls within the
continuing care exception is at the discretion of the treating physician. As long
as the treating physician continues to refer a patient for diagnostic tests, the
auxiliary service providers will be performing continuing care that, in reality,
neither they nor the patient have control over. Of course, if the radiologist or
other auxiliary service provider ordered the diagnostic tests or treatment, the
provider would fall within the traditional continuing care exception.' 46 This,
however, is not the case in Montgomery. In this case, the SCR radiologists did
not have personal contact with Montgomery and never ordered follow-up tests. 47
The majority imposes a duty of continuing care upon the radiology group because
the treating physician decided to order more tests. Simply stated, the majority's
decision holds that an auxiliary service provider has a duty of continuing care
because he or she is referred to perform successive diagnostic services, not
because there was a duty of continuing care to provide those services. 4 ' This is
not only an illogical result, but it is one that gives no guidance to providers of
auxiliary services.
Finally, the majority's decision seems a clear departure from the intent of the
Missouri General Assembly. Although the continuing care exception has no
statutory equivalent, the General Assembly has continuously amended Section

143. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 192-93.
144. Id. at 194-95.

145. Id. at 195.
146. Id. at 197.
147. See id. at 196.
148. Id.
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516.105 to clearly state when an exception is to apply."n9 After the decision in
Thatcher v. De Tar,50 the Missouri General Assembly amended the statute to
include an exception for physicians who negligently leave foreign objects in the
body of those on whom they operate.'"' In those instances, the statute of
limitation does not begin to run until the date of discovery. 52 Furthermore, after
the decision in Weiss v. Rojanasathit,'3 the General Assembly amended the
statute to include an exception for a physician's negligent failure to report the
results of medical tests.154 In those instances, the statute of limitation does not
begin to run until the date of discovery.' 5 In both of these instances, the
Missouri Supreme Court properly ruled according to the statute of limitation and
allowed the Missouri General Assembly to act.' 56 This is the constitutional role
of the court system. As the Missouri Supreme Court stated in Weiss, it is the
legislative branch of the government that determines the policy of the state and
the "court must follow the policy determination expressed there."' 57 It is not the
role of the courts to circumvent the legislative process, especially when the
General Assembly has clearly stated its position. Arguments to change clearly
established statutory law "should be addressed to the General Assembly" because
its members are held accountable by the voters of the State of Missouri.' 8 As
stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in Laughlin v. Forgrave,'59 "our function
is to interpret the law; it is not to disregard the law as written by the General
Assembly.""'6 In Montgomery, the Missouri Supreme Court ignored these
principles and overstepped its bounds. In effect, the Missouri Supreme Court
improperly voided Section 516.105 and applied the continuing care exception to
virtually every type of medical care provider. Thus, by broadening the scope of
the continuing care exception, Section 516.105 has lost the effect the legislature
intended it to have and will now apply only to a minority of situations. Because
of this, the Missouri Supreme Court seems to have made the exception the rule.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra notes 25-39.
173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943); see also supra notes 40-55.
MO. REV. STAT. § 516.105(1) (2001).
Id.
975 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. 1998); see also supra notes 95-100.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105(2) (2001).
Id.
See supra notes 33-39.
Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 121.

158. Id. at 117; see also Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. 1968).

159. 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1968).
160. Id. at 314.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Montgomery v. South County Radiologists,Inc.,' 61 the Missouri Supreme

Court determined that the continuing care exception to the two-year statute of
62
limitation in Section 516.105 applies to entities as well as individual physicians'
and that the continuing care exception applies to groups that provide merely
auxiliary diagnostic services. 63 The first determination is consistent with the
language of Section 516.105 and is a logical progression in the modem medical
care environment. The majority's second determination, however, is not
consistent with the language of Section 516.10 or the holdings in previous cases
and is an unfortunate example of a court taking the role of the Missouri General
Assembly upon itself. By expanding the scope of the continuing care exception
to cover providers of auxiliary services and forcing these groups to defend stale
claims, the result will be an unnecessary increase in the overall cost of health care
while providing an incentive for medical groups to find new ways to avoid
liability for stale claims. Furthermore, the majority's reasoning provides no
guidance for providers of auxiliary services because whether the group has a duty
of continuing care will depend on how often the primary physician refers the
patient to the group for diagnostic services. Finally and most importantly, the
majority's decision is a clear departure from the intent of the Missouri General
Assembly. The majority's overly broad expansion of the scope of the continuing
care exception will result in the exception applying in more cases than the rule
in Section 516.105. This, in effect, nullifies the legislature's intent of limiting
actions against medical providers to the specific provisions listed and has made
the exception the rule in Missouri.
JAMES

B. YORK

161. 49 S.W.3d 191 (Mo. 2001).

162. Id. at 194.
163. Id. at 195.
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